Religion, therefore, as I now ask you arbitrarily to take it, shall mean
for us the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their
solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to
whatever they may consider the divine. Since the relation may be either
moral, physical, or ritual, it is evident that out of religion in the sense
in which we take it, theologies, philosophies, and ecclesiastical
organizations may secondarily grow. In these lectures, however, as I have
already said, the immediate personal experiences will amply fill our time,
and we shall hardly consider theology or ecclesiasticism at all.
We escape much controversial matter by this arbitrary definition of our
field. But, still, a chance of controversy comes up over the word ’divine,'
if we take it in the definition in too narrow a sense. There are systems of
thought which the world usually calls religious, and yet which do not
positively assume a God. Buddhism is in this case. Popularly, of course,
the Buddha himself stands in place of a God; but in strictness the
Buddhistic system is atheistic. Modern transcendental idealism,
Emersonianism, for instance, also seems to let God evaporate into abstract
Ideality. Not a deity in concreto, not a superhuman person, but the
immanent divinity in things, the essentially spiritual structure of the
universe, is the object of the transcendentalist cult. In that address to
the graduating class at Divinity College in 1838 which made Emerson famous,
the frank expression of this worship of mere abstract laws was what made
the scandal of the performance.
"These laws," said the speaker, "execute themselves. They are out of time,
out of space, and not subject to circumstance: Thus, in the soul of man
there is a justice whose retributions are instant and entire. He who does a
good deed is instantly ennobled. He who does a mean deed is by the action
itself contracted. He who puts off impurity thereby puts on purity. If a
man is at heart just, then in so far is he God; the safety of God, the
immortality of God, the majesty of God, do enter into that man with
justice. If a man dissemble, deceive, he deceives himself, and goes out of
acquaintance with his own being. Character is always known. Thefts never
enrich; alms never impoverish; murder will speak out of stone walls. The
least admixture of a lie—for example, the taint of vanity, any attempt to
make a good impression, a favorable appearance—will instantly vitiate the
effect. But speak the truth, and all things alive or brute are vouchers,
and the very roots of the grass underground there do seem to stir and move
to bear your witness. For all things proceed out of the same spirit, which
is differently named love, justice, temperance, in its different
applications, just as the ocean receives different names on the several
shores which it washes. In so far as he roves from these ends, a man
bereaves himself of power, of auxiliaries. His being shrinks … he becomes
less and less, a mote, a point, until absolute badness is absolute death.
The perception of this law awakens in the mind a sentiment which we call
the religious sentiment, and which makes our highest happiness. Wonderful
is its power to charm and to command. It is a mountain air. It is the
embalmer of the world. It makes the sky and the hills sublime, and the
silent song of the stars is it. It is the beatitude of man. It makes him
illimitable. When he says 'I ought'; when love warns him; when he chooses,
warned from on high, the good and great deed; then, deep melodies wander
through his soul from supreme wisdom. Then he can worship, and be enlarged
by his worship; for he can never go behind this sentiment. All the
expressions of this sentiment are sacred and permanent in proportion to
their purity. [They] affect us more than all other compositions. The
sentences of the olden time, which ejaculate this piety, are still fresh
and fragrant. And the unique impression of Jesus upon mankind, whose name
is not so much written as ploughed into the history of this world, is proof
of the subtle virtue of this infusion."[2]
Such is the Emersonian religion. The universe has a divine soul of order,
which soul is moral, being also the soul within the soul of man. But
whether this soul of the universe be a mere quality like the eye's
brilliancy or the skin's softness, or whether it be a self-conscious life
like the eye's seeing or the skin's feeling, is a decision that never
unmistakably appears in Emerson's pages. It quivers on the boundary of
these things, sometimes leaning one way, sometimes the other, to suit the
literary rather than the philosophic need. Whatever it is, though, it is
active. As much as if it were a God, we can trust it to protect all ideal
interests and keep the world's balance straight. The sentences in which
Emerson, to the very end, gave utterance to this faith are as fine as
anything in literature: "If you love and serve men, you cannot by any
hiding or stratagem escape the remuneration. Secret retributions are always
restoring the level, when disturbed, of the divine justice. It is
impossible to tilt the beam. All the tyrants and proprietors and
monopolists of the world in vain set their shoulders to heave the bar.
Settles forevermore the ponderous equator to its line, and man and mote,
and star and sun, must range to it, or be pulverized by the recoil."[3]
Now it would be too absurd to say that the inner experiences that underlie
such expressions of faith as this and impel the writer to their utterance
are quite unworthy to be called religious experiences. The sort of appeal
that Emersonian optimism, on the one hand, and Buddhistic pessimism, on the
other, make to the individual and the sort of response which he makes to
them in his life are in fact indistinguishable from, and in many respects
identical with, the best Christian appeal and response. We must therefore,
from the experiential point of view, call these godless or quasi-godless
creeds 'religions'; and accordingly when in our definition of religion we
speak of the individual's relation to 'what he considers the divine,' we
must interpret the term 'divine' very broadly, as denoting any object that
is godlike, whether it be a concrete deity or not.
But the term 'godlike,' if thus treated as a floating general quality,
becomes exceedingly vague, for many gods have flourished in religious
history, and their attributes have been discrepant enough. What then is
that essentially godlike quality—be it embodied in a concrete deity or
not—our relation to which determines our character as religious men? It
will repay us to seek some answer to this question before we proceed
farther.
For one thing, gods are conceived to be first things in the way of being
and power. They overarch and envelop, and from them there is no escape.
What relates to them is the first and last word in the way of truth.
Whatever then were most primal and enveloping and deeply true might at this
rate be treated as godlike, and a man's religion might thus be identified
with his attitude, whatever it might be, towards what he felt to be the
primal truth.
Such a definition as this would in a way be defensible. Religion, whatever
it is, is a man's total reaction upon life, so why not say that any total
reaction upon life is a religion? Total reactions are different from casual
reactions, and total attitudes are different from usual or professional
attitudes. To get at them you must go behind the foreground of existence
and reach down to that curious sense of the whole residual cosmos as an
everlasting presence, intimate or alien, terrible or amusing, lovable or
odious, which in some degree every one possesses. This sense of the world's
presence, appealing as it does to our peculiar individual temperament,
makes us either strenuous or careless, devout or blasphemous, gloomy or
exultant, about life at large; and our reaction, involuntary and
inarticulate and often half unconscious as it is, is the completest of all
our answers to the question, "What is the character of this universe in
which we dwell?" It expresses our individual sense of it in the most
definite way. Why then not call these reactions our religion, no matter
what specific character they may have? Non-religious as some of these
reactions may be, in one sense of the word 'religious,' they yet belong to
the general sphere of the religious life, and so should generically be
classed as religious reactions. "He believes in No-God, and he worships
him," said a colleague of mine of a student who was manifesting a fine
atheistic ardor; and the more fervent opponents of Christian doctrine have
often enough shown a temper which, psychologically considered, is
indistinguishable from religious zeal.
But so very broad a use of the word 'religion' would be inconvenient,
however defensible it might remain on logical grounds. There are trifling,
sneering attitudes even towards the whole of life; and in some men these
attitudes are final and systematic. It would strain the ordinary use of
language too much to call such attitudes religious, even though, from the
point of view of an unbiased critical philosophy, they might conceivably be
perfectly reasonable ways of looking upon life. Voltaire, for example,
writes thus to a friend, at the age of seventy-three: "As for myself," he
says, "weak as I am, I carry on the war to the last moment, I get a hundred
pike-thrusts, I return two hundred, and I laugh. I see near my door Geneva
on fire with quarrels over nothing, and I laugh again; and, thank God, I
can look upon the world as a farce even when it becomes as tragic as it
sometimes does. All comes out even at the end of the day, and all comes out
still more even when all the days are over."
Much as we may admire such a robust old gamecock spirit in a
valetudinarian, to call it a religious spirit would be odd. Yet it is for
the moment Voltaire's reaction on the whole of life. Je m’en fiche is the
vulgar French equivalent for our English ejaculation 'Who cares?' And the
happy term je m'en fichisme recently has been invented to designate the
systematic determination not to take anything in life too solemnly. 'All is
vanity' is the relieving word in all difficult crises for this mode of
thought, which that exquisite literary genius Renan took pleasure, in his
later days of sweet decay, in putting into coquettishly sacrilegious forms
which remain to us as excellent expressions of the 'all is vanity' state of
mind. Take the following passage, for example, we must hold to duty, even
against the evidence, Renan says, but he then goes on:—
"There are many chances that the world may be nothing but a fairy pantomime
of which no God has care. We must therefore arrange ourselves so that on
neither hypothesis we shall be completely wrong. We must listen to the
superior voices, but in such a way that if the second hypothesis were true
we should not have been too completely duped. If in effect the world be not
a serious thing, it is the dogmatic people who will be the shallow ones,
and the worldly minded whom the theologians now call frivolous will be
those who are really wise.
"In utrumque paratus, then. Be ready for anything—that perhaps is wisdom.
Give ourselves up, according to the hour, to confidence, to skepticism, to
optimism, to irony, and we may be sure that at certain moments at least we
shall be with the truth. … Good-humor is a philosophic state of mind; it
seems to say to Nature that we take her no more seriously than she takes
us. I maintain that one should always talk of philosophy with a smile. We
owe it to the Eternal to be virtuous; but we have the right to add to this
tribute our irony as a sort of personal reprisal. In this way we return to
the right quarter jest for jest; we play the trick that has been played on
us. Saint Augustine's phrase: Lord, if we are deceived, it is by thee!
remains a fine one, well suited to our modern feeling. Only we wish the
Eternal to know that if we accept the fraud, we accept it knowingly and
willingly. We are resigned in advance to losing the interest on our
investments of virtue, but we wish not to appear ridiculous by having
counted on them too securely."[4]
Surely all the usual associations of the word 'religion' would have to be
stripped away if such a systematic parti pris of irony were also to be
denoted by the name. For common men 'religion’ whatever more special
meanings it may have, signifies always a serious state of mind. If any one
phrase could gather its universal message, that phrase would be, 'All is
not vanity in this Universe, whatever the appearances may suggest.' If it
can stop anything, religion as commonly apprehended can stop just such
chaffing talk as Renan's. It favors gravity, not pertness; it says 'hush'
to all vain chatter and smart wit.
But if hostile to light irony, religion is equally hostile to heavy
grumbling and complaint. The world appears tragic enough in some religions,
but the tragedy is realized as purging, and a way of deliverance is held to
exist. We shall see enough of the religious melancholy in a future lecture;
but melancholy, according to our ordinary use of language, forfeits all
title to be called religious when, in Marcus Aurelius's racy words, the
sufferer simply lies kicking and screaming after the fashion of a
sacrificed pig. The mood of a Schopenhauer or a Nietsche,—and in a less
degree one may sometimes say the same of our own sad Carlyle,—though often
an ennobling sadness, is almost as often only peevishness running away with
the bit between its teeth. The sallies of the two German authors remind
one, half the time, of the sick shriekings of two dying rats. They lack the
purgatorial note which religious sadness gives forth.
There must be something solemn, serious, and tender about any attitude
which we denominate religious. If glad, it must not grin or snicker; if
sad, it must not scream or curse. It is precisely as being solemn
experiences that I wish to interest you in religious experiences. So I
propose—arbitrarily again, if you please—to narrow our definition once more
by saying that the word 'divine,' as employed therein, shall mean for us
not merely the primal and enveloping and real, for that meaning if taken
without restriction might well prove too broad. The divine shall mean for
us only such a primal reality as the individual feels impelled to respond
to solemnly and gravely, and neither by a curse nor a jest.
But solemnity, and gravity, and all such emotional attributes, admit of
various shades; and, do what we will with our defining, the truth must at
last be confronted that we are dealing with a field of experience where
there is not a single conception that can be sharply drawn. The pretension,
under such conditions, to be rigorously 'scientific' or 'exact' in our
terms would only stamp us as lacking in understanding of our task. Things
are more or less divine, states of mind are more or less religious,
reactions are more or less total, but the boundaries are always misty, and
it is everywhere a question of amount and degree. Nevertheless, at their
extreme of development, there can never be any question as to what
experiences are religious. The divinity of the object and the solemnity of
the reaction are too well marked for doubt. Hesitation as to whether a
state of mind is 'religious,' or 'irreligious,' or 'moral,' or
'philosophical,' is only likely to arise when the state of mind is weakly
characterized, but in that case it will be hardly worthy of our study at
all. With states that can only by courtesy be called religious we need have
nothing to do, our only profitable business being with what nobody can
possibly feel tempted to call anything else. I said in my former lecture
that we learn most about a thing when we view it under a microscope, as it
were, or in its most exaggerated form. This is as true of religious
phenomena as of any other kind of fact. The only cases likely to be
profitable enough to repay our attention will therefore be cases where the
religious spirit is unmistakable and extreme. Its fainter manifestations we
may tranquilly pass by. Here, for example, is the total reaction upon life
of Frederick Locker Lampson, whose autobiography, entitled 'Confidences,'
proves him to have been a most amiable man.
"I am so far resigned to my lot that I feel small pain at the thought of
having to part from what has been called the pleasant habit of existence,
the sweet fable of life. I would not care to live my wasted life over
again, and so to prolong my span. Strange to say, I have but little wish to
be younger. I submit with a chill at my heart. I humbly submit because it
is the Divine Will, and my appointed destiny. I dread the increase of
infirmities that will make me a burden to those around me, those dear to
me. No! let me slip away as quietly and comfortably as I can. Let the end
come, if peace come with it.
"I do not know that there is a great deal to be said for this world, or our
sojourn here upon it; but it has pleased God so to place us, and it must
please me also. I ask you, what is human life? Is not it a maimed happiness
care and weariness, weariness and care, with the baseless expectation, the
strange cozenage of a brighter to-morrow? At best it is but a froward
child, that must be played with and humored, to keep it quiet till it falls
asleep, and then the care is over."[5]
This is a complex, a tender, a submissive, and a graceful state of mind.
For myself, I should have no objection to calling it on the whole a
religious state of mind, although I dare say that to many of you it may
seem too listless and half-hearted to merit so good a name. But what
matters it in the end whether we call such a state of mind religious or
not? It is too insignificant for our instruction in any case; and its very
possessor wrote it down in terms which he would not have used unless he had
been thinking of more energetically religious moods in others, with which
he found himself unable to compete. It is with these more energetic states
that our sole business lies, and we can perfectly well afford to let the
minor notes and the uncertain border go.
It was the extremer cases that I had in mind a little while ago when I said
that personal religion, even without theology or ritual, would prove to
embody some elements that morality pure and simple does not contain. You
may remember that I promised shortly to point out what those elements were.
In a general way I can now say what I had in mind.
"I accept the universe" is reported to have been a favorite utterance of
our New England transcendentalist, Margaret Fuller; and when some one
repeated this phrase to Thomas Carlyle, his sardonic comment is said to
have been: "Gad! she'd better!": At bottom the whole concern of both
morality and religion is with the manner of our acceptance of the universe.
Do we accept it only in part and grudgingly, or heartily and altogether?
Shall our protests against certain things in it be radical and unforgiving,
or shall we think that, even with evil, there are ways of living that must
lead to good? If we accept the whole, shall we do so as if stunned into
submission,—as Carlyle would have us—"Gad! we'd better!"—or shall we do so
with enthusiastic assent? Morality pure and simple accepts the law of the
whole which it finds reigning, so far as to acknowledge and obey it, but it
may obey it with the heaviest and coldest heart, and never cease to feel it
as a yoke. But for religion, in its strong and fully developed
manifestations, the service of the highest never is felt as a yoke. Dull
submission is left far behind, and a mood of welcome, which may fill any
place on the scale between cheerful serenity and enthusiastic gladness, has
taken its place.
It makes a tremendous emotional and practical difference to one whether one
accept the universe in the drab discolored way of stoic resignation to
necessity, or with the passionate happiness of Christian saints. The
difference is as great as that between passivity and activity, as that
between the defensive and the aggressive mood. Gradual as are the steps by
which an individual may grow from one state into the other, many as are the
intermediate stages which different individuals represent, yet when you
place the typical extremes beside each other for comparison, you feel that
two discontinuous psychological universes confront you, and that in passing
from one to the other a 'critical point' has been overcome.
--
-Eric
